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INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AGREEMENTS & 
INTERNATIONAL DATA PROTECTION: 
AVOIDING A GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE STATE 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2013, the trust between the American public and its government was 
broken,1 resulting in “a sea change in the policy landscape related to 
surveillance.”2 Because of the Snowden disclosures, the American 
intelligence community was forced into a dialogue with the public and 
began trading security for domestic legitimacy.3 However, this 
conversation is not only of domestic concern.4 As national security 
continues to focus on international threats, international solutions and 
approaches to threats must be implemented. Globally, individual privacy 
concerns prompted significant movement among data protection rights and 
legislation post-Snowden.5  Democratic norms demand transparency and 
oversight for the intelligence community.6 While this note touches on 
citizens’ concerns in protecting their data privacy from unchecked national 
surveillance regimes, its primary focus is in maintaining the integrity of 
 
 
1 See generally Marcy Wheeler, Government Spying: Why You Can’t ‘Just Trust Us,’  NATION 
(Jun. 19, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/government-spying-why-you-cant-just-trust-us/; 
Timothy B. Lee, Here’s why ‘Trust Us’ Isn’t Working for the NSA Any More, WASH. POST (Jul. 30, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/07/30/heres-why-trust-us-isnt-
working-for-the-nsa-any-more/?utm_term=.8fee9542b2f5. 
2 Rainey Reitman, 3 Years Later, the Snowden Leaks Have Changed How the World Sees NSA 
Surveillance, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jun. 5, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/3-years-
later-snowden-leaks-have-changed-how-world-sees-nsa-surveillance. 
3 Jack Goldsmith, Three Years Later: How Snowden Helped the U.S. Intelligence Community, 
LAWFARE (Jun. 6, 2016, 9:32 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-years-later-how-snowden-
helped-us-intelligence-community. 
4 See Global Opposition to USA Big Brother Mass Surveillance, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 18, 2015), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/03/global-opposition-to-usa-big-brother-mass-
surveillance/ (detailing global public opposition to the Unites States’ surveillance practices); see also 
David Miranda & Joseph Huff-Hanon, Edward Snowden Inspires Global Treaty for Online Privacy, 
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 24, 2015),  http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/edward-snowden-
inspires-global-treaty-for-online-privacy-20150924 (discussing the drafting of an international treaty 
to deal with post-Snowden privacy concerns). 
5 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, Q&A: GUIDANCE ON TRANSATLANTIC DATA TRANSFERS 
FOLLOWING THE SCHREMS RULING 1 (2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
6014_en.htm. 
6 Elizabeth Sepper, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing, 46 TEX. INT’L L. J. 151, 
166 (2011). 
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domestic safeguards by pushing against secret intelligence-sharing 
agreements that sidestep national laws. This note examines legal 
challenges that dismantle and change the international surveillance 
framework. 
Part II discusses the Five Eyes alliance and intelligence-sharing 
relationships between states participating in the information-sharing 
agreement, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, in a 
post-Snowden world. Part II also reviews laws within these nations that 
relate to intelligence-gathering and sharing. Germany is also discussed in 
Part II, contrasting its role as a Western ally but not as a Five Eyes partner.  
Part III considers the Privacy Shield and European courts’ response to 
national security justifications in Schrems I.  Part IV draws lessons from 
Schrems I and the European Union’s data protection regime, and proposes 
that American lawmakers and judges take greater responsibility in 
overseeing the U.S. intelligence community, evinced by the excessive 
deference these two branches afford to the Executive Branch as an 
obstacle to democratic governance. Finally, this note concludes by 
encouraging greater congressional engagement with data protection issues, 
including national security concerns and government surveillance, given 
the threat posed by globalized threats to national security.  
II. THE FIVE EYES 
 While the Five Eyes agreement is one of the more famous 
intelligence-sharing agreements, there are other partnerships and less 
formal means of collaboration.7 Often, the exchange of intelligence 
depends on the health of the relationship between collaborating parties and 
the historical level of cooperation.8 All of these intelligence-sharing 
relationships depend on trust—trusting the veracity of the information, its 
confidentiality, and the sensitivity with which the receiving party 
demonstrates in handling the information.9 Breaches of trust in these 
intelligence-sharing relationships exacerbate the inherent tensions residing 
in cooperative espionage.10 As previously discussed, the impact of the 
 
 
7 Scarlet Kim, et al., The “Backdoor Search Loophole” Isn’t Our Only Problem: The Dangers of 
Global Information Sharing, JUST. SEC. (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/47282/backdoor-search-loophole-isnt-problem-dangers-global-
information-sharing/. 
8 Priscilla Alvarez, The Risks of Sharing Intelligence, ATLANTIC (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/trump-russia-intelligence-sharing/526857/. 
9 See Sepper, supra note 6, at 162. 
10 INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 23 (Hans Born et al. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss3/12
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various leaks between the U.S. and its partners have corroded the trust 
underlying these intelligence-sharing alliances.11 The greater threat to the 
status quo surrounding the intelligence community, however, is the onset 
of litigation that attacks the global infrastructure facilitating the streams of 
information between allied states.12 This note discusses the circumvention 
of states’ own domestic protections against unauthorized surveillance and 
data collection through such agreements. 
Governments do not collect information solely for their own local use. 
Information-sharing between allied states with similar interests and threats 
is an established practice that should shape the debate around government 
surveillance. There is potential that information collected in the U.S. will 
be circulated beyond the American border.  In 1946, a series of bilateral 
intelligence sharing agreements between five English-speaking countries 
developed into the UKUSA agreement – now known as the Five Eyes 
alliance.13 This post-war alliance established a global surveillance 
infrastructure to observe the world’s communications, internationally and 
domestically.14  Besides the United States, the four other countries are 
Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand—nations that are 
unaffected by the First Amendment.15 While the crux of these agreements 
 
 
eds., 2011). “[I]ntelligence suffers from a paradox - it is only valuable when shared with those who 
need it, but the more it is shared the more it risks being compromised, and the lower its value.” Janine 
McGruddy, Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight, 6 J. OF STRATEGIC 
STUD. 214, 215 (2013). 
11  Henry Overton, The Five Eyes in the Trump era: Dominant or Diminished?, FOREIGN BRIEF 
(July 7, 2017), http://www.foreignbrief.com/united-states/five-eyes-trump-era-dominant-diminished/.  
“The leaks from Washington could very well justify changes to the processes of intelligence sharing 
between the Five Eyes members in the same way that Trump’s disclosure of sensitive information 
gathered by Israel caused the country to ‘tweak’ its intelligence sharing protocols with the US.” Id. See 
also Alvarez, supra note 8. 
12 This note discusses several cases that look to expose the secret information-sharing agreements 
that intensify the “accountability gap” present in the intelligence community. INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, at 90-91 (defining 
“accountability gap” as “a failure by review bodies to keep pace with international cooperation 
between intelligence services”). 
13 The Five Eyes Fact Sheet, PRIVACY INT’L (Nov. 26, 2013) 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/1204/five-eyes-fact-sheet. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. In March 1946, the UKUSA agreement was brokered between the United States and Great 
Britain. The deal was then extended to Canada “in 1948, and Australia and New Zealand in 1956.” 
Richard Norton-Taylor, Not So Secret: Deal at the Heart of UK-US Intelligence, GUARDIAN (Jun. 24, 
2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/25/intelligence-deal-uk-us-released. The Five 
Eyes partners do often join up with other countries. J. Vitor Tossini, The Five Eyes – The Intelligence 
Alliance of the Anglosphere, UK DEF. J. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-
eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/ (“[T]he co-operation with Denmark, France, 
Norway and the Netherlands receives the name of ‘Nine Eyes’, and there is the ‘Fourteen Eyes’ which 
consists of the previously mentioned Nine Eyes plus Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden.”) 
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is to collaborate on international crime, there is evidence that these 
nations’ respective intelligence agencies have conducted domestic 
surveillance circumventing their local, legal safeguards.16 
A. The United States 
In the United States, private technology companies can be forced to 
provide users’ data through National Security Letters (“NSLs”) or the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) for national security 
investigations.17 These orders come with a nondisclosure provision that 
muzzle the recipient from disclosing that they were forced to pass this 
information along to the government.18 FISA orders were created with the 
passage of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. 19 The law 
determined that “non-criminal electronic surveillances within the United 
States were only permissible for collecting foreign intelligence and/or 
foreign counterintelligence.”20 For FISA orders, a Foreign Intelligence 
 
 
The official name of the Fourteen Eyes is SIGNIT Seniors Europe, and its main purpose is to 
“coordinate the exchange of military signals amongst its members.” Id.  
16 For example, documents leaked by Edward Snowden show Australia’s surveillance agency 
offered to share “bulk, unselected, unminimised metadata” as long as no data targeted an Australian 
national. Ewen MacAskill, James Ball, & Katharine Murphy, Revealed: Australian Spy Agency 
Offered to Share Data About Ordinary Citizens, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/revealed-australian-spy-agency-offered-to-share-
data-about-ordinary-citizens.  Former United Kingdom home secretary, David Blunkett has said that 
“the NSA and . . . the U.S. use material gathered from network and service providers and offer it rather 
than having it sought from them in a way that makes authorization extremely difficult.” This would 
mean that GSHQ circumvented domestic laws by obtaining information without seeking ministerial 
approval, reaching information unobtainable by legal means. Nicholas Watt, NSA ‘Offers Intelligence 
to British Counterparts to Skirt UK Law,’ GUARDIAN, June 10, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jun/10/nsa-offers-intelligence-british-counterparts-
blunkett. 
17 Wendy Everette, Comment, “The FBI Has Not Been Here [Watch Very Closely for the 
Removal of This Sign]”: Warrant Canaries and First Amendment Protection for Compelled Speech, 
23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 378 (2016). 
18 Id. at 383. Before Congress passed the USA Freedom Act, NSL recipients could not disclose 
the fact they had received an order to anyone but their attorney and the staff members that retrieved the 
requested information. Id. 
19 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). FISA has been amended several 
times to include physical searches, pen registers, trace and trap devices, and increased presidential 
authority to approve limited physical searches without court orders. See James G. McAdams, III, 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview, FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 
CTRS. 4 (2007), http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-
faqs/researchby-subject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf. 
20 McAdams, III, supra note 19, at 2. After the September 11 attacks, the USA Patriot Act 
changed the previous requirement that mandated the only purpose of the proposed surveillance was to 
obtain foreign intelligence and amended it so that the applicant only needed to certify that a significant 
purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence. Id. at 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss3/12
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Surveillance Court judge approves a request after reviewing the intended 
target and the presented accompanying procedures meant to minimize 
broad data collection.  However, before the request is considered by the 
FISC judge, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reviews the agency’s 
request prior to its submission.21  
The DOJ’s application must contain statements that show the targeted 
individual is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, certification 
from a high-ranking executive branch official detailing that the 
information to be obtained is foreign intelligence information that cannot 
be obtained by normal investigative techniques, include information about 
any previous applications surrounding the target, and list the type of 
communication or activities to be subject to the surveillance and contain a 
description of the information sought.22 Upon approval, court orders can 
be used to survey targets, access metadata, and other content.23 
It is critical to note that the only information available to the FISC is 
what is provided by the DOJ.24  There is no opponent or adversarial 
balance to counter the DOJ’s presentation.25 Despite the fact that the court 
is reviewing information to certify the application meets statute’s 
requirements, this is not enough oversight. The U.S. government’s failure 
to respect individuals’ privacy in crossing legal boundaries casts 
tremendous doubt on the FISC.26 At the very least, the appearance of 
fairness is undermined by the Snowden revelations, and the lack of 
 
 
21 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), supra note 19.  Precisely, “[t]he Attorney 
General must personally approve each final FISA application.” Id. 
22 Id. The application must also present the proposed length of time, disclose if physical entry to 
the location is required, and present any minimization procedures regarding the acquisition, use, and 
retention of information “concerning nonconsenting U.S. persons.” Id. “One common minimization 
procedure is what is known as an ‘information-screening wall.’ These ‘walls’ require an official not 
involved in the criminal investigation to review the raw materials gathered by FISA surveillance and 
only pass on information that might be relevant evidence.” 
23 Everette, supra note 17, at 392. 
24 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), supra note 19. The FISC judge is completely 
reliant on the DOJ’s representations in assessing whether the application has probable cause showing  
That one of four [following] conditions has been met: (1) the target knowingly engages in 
clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power which ‘may involve’ a 
criminal law violation; (2) the target knowingly engages in other secret intelligence activities 
on behalf of a foreign power under the direction of an intelligence network and his activities 
involve or are about to involve criminal violations; (3) the target knowingly engages in 
sabotage or international terrorism or is preparing for such activities; or (4) the target 
knowingly aids or abets another who acts in one of the above ways. 
Id. See also Everette, supra note 17, at 391.  
25 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), supra note 19.  
26 See generally Glenn Greenwald, Fisa Court Oversight: A Look Inside a Secret and Empty 
process, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013, 19:36 EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/19/fisa-court-oversight-process-secrecy. 
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transparency as provided by FISA does little to assuage concerns that 
surveillance is being conducted as permitted by law. 
In a post-Snowden world, knowing the extent of government 
surveillance and corporate compliance, intelligence sharing between 
nations threatens the privacy rights of citizens and its transnational 
neighbors. Distortion of the use of secret government surveillance, 
shrouded by secret intelligence-sharing agreements, threatens the public 
debate surrounding national security and individual privacy. This 
distortion persists on an international scale through the collaboration 
between national security agencies in the United States and their Five Eyes 
allies.  
In 2017, several leaks plagued the Trump administration in its first 
year, cracking the foundation of trust among Five Eyes nations.27 In May 
2017, British officials condemned leaks 28 from the investigation 
surrounding the Manchester bombing, 29 and even temporarily paused the 
sharing of information with American law enforcement.30 Earlier that 
month, President Trump was criticized for reportedly sharing sensitive 
information about Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations by 
another U.S. ally, Israel, with Russia, against their wishes.31 While the 
 
 
27 Overton, supra note 11.  
28 Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, Photographs of Manchester Bomb Parts Published After 
Leak, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/24/us-officials-
leak-more-manchester-details-hours-after-uk-rebuke. The New York Times published images of 
shrapnel, remnants of the bomb, and the backpack worn by the attacker on May 24, 2017, only two 
days after the attack. C.J. Chivers, Found at the Scene in Manchester: Shrapnel, a Backpack and a 
Battery, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-arena-bomb-materials-
photos.html. In addition, the attacker’s name was also released by U.S. media while unreleased details 
concerning the bomber were disclosed by a French official. 
29 On May 22, 2017, a bombing had occurred at a concert in Manchester, England that resulted in 
multiple deaths. Camila Domonoske, British Police Decry Apparent U.S. Leaks of Manchester Attack 
Evidence, NPR (May 25, 2017, 11:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/05/25/530006788/british-police-decry-apparent-u-s-leaks-of-manchester-attack-evidence. 
As a part of international counterterrorism efforts, U.K. officials worked with international law 
enforcement groups to investigate the attack, including the United States. Id. 
30 Jake Kanter, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson ‘Regrets’ Manchester Bombing Leaks, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 26, 2017, 8:58 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/rex-tillerson-regrets-manchester-
bombing-leaks-2017-5. Commenting on the leaks surrounding the Manchester bombing investigation, 
President Trump called the situation “deeply troubling” and “a grave threat to… national security” 
before concluding that “[t]here is no relationship… cherish[ed] more than the Special Relationship 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.” Statement from President Donald J. Trump,  
WHITE HOUSE (May 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-
donald-j-trump-6/. 
31 Adam Goldman, Eric Schmitt & Peter Baker, Israel Said to Be Source of Secret Intelligence 
Trump Gave to Russians, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/world/middleeast/israel-trump-classified-intelligence-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss3/12
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President’s actions did not receive any admonition from Israel,32 the 
disclosure was seen as a “breach of espionage etiquette” that could 
discourage American allies from sharing helpful information with the 
United States.33 Despite efforts to eliminate these leaks,34 sensitive 
information continues to be impermissibly shared.35 The impact of these 
 
 
russia.html; Mark Hensch, Israeli Intelligence ‘Boiling Mad’ Over Trump Disclosure: Report, HILL 
(June 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/333670-israeli-intelligence-boiling-mad-
at-trump-report. Several news outlets identified Israeli intelligence as the source of the information. 
See Hensch, supra; Goldman et al, supra; Shane Harris, Israeli Source Seen as Key to Countering 
Islamic State Threat; WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/israeli-
source-seen-as-key-to-countering-islamic-state-threat-1495068912; see also Harris, supra (discussing 
potential harms to counterterrorism efforts, relationships with allies, and the intelligence community). 
32  Joshua Mitnick, Former Top Israeli Officials Break With Government Line and Call Trump 
Leak Very Troubling, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2017, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-israel-trump-russia-20170517-story.html. Peter 
Beaumont, Netanyahu and Trump Speak on Phone Amid Growing Row Over Russia Leak, GUARDIAN  
(May 17, 2017, 08:20 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/17/netanyahu-trump-
phonecall-israel-russia-intelligence-leak. Yisrael Katz, Israel’s intelligence minister, commented on 
the matter, saying, “Intelligence cooperation between Israel and the United States regarding the threats 
posed by Iran and its proxies and Isis and its affiliates will continue and deepen.” Id. However, other 
unnamed sources stated their frustration with the U.S. over the situation. See Kavitha Surana, Dan De 
Luce & Robbie Gramer, Israeli Intelligence Furious Over Trump’s Loose Lips, FOREIGN POLICY (May 
19, 2017, 3:32 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/19/israeli-intelligence-furious-over-trumps-
loose-lips-russia-iran-syria/. 
33  Peter Baker & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Defends Sharing Information on ISIS Threat 
with Russia, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/trump-
intelligence-russia-classified.html. See also Jack Moore, U.S. Officials ‘Warned Israel’ Not to Share 
Sensitive Intel With Trump, NEWSWEEK (May 16, 2017, 6:05 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-
officials-warned-israel-not-share-sensitive-intel-trump-609782. This alleged breach violates “the most 
jealously guarded and sensitive areas of intelligence activity…which shields information supplied to 
an agency by intelligence partners in other countries from attribution.” INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
COOPERATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, at 5. 
34 Zeke J. Miller, The Trump Administration Pledges to Crack Down on Leaks, TIME (Aug. 5, 
2017, 9:00 AM), http://time.com/4887864/trump-leaks-crackdown/. The leaks emerging from this 
administration have drawn attention to the inner workings of the Trump administration. See Callum 
Borchers, While Trump Tweets About ‘Fake News,’ His Leak Problem Is Worsening, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/05/while-trump-tweets-
about-fake-news-his-leak-problem-is-worsening/?utm_term=.d7d3c4aa6620; Niall Stanage, Trump 
White House Besieged by Leaks, HILL (Feb. 9, 2017, 6:00 AM) 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/318621-trump-white-house-besieged-by-leaks. The 
continued leaks leave a “‘corrosive effect’ on global data sharing with Washington” and reflect an 
internal distrust amongst President Trump and the intelligence community; Yonah Jeremy Bob, 
Exclusive: Ex-US Intel Chief Says Trump Leaks Have A ‘Corrosive’ Effect, JERUSALEM POST (Aug 
11., 2016, 11:09 AM), http://www.jpost.com/International/Ex-US-intel-chief-Trump-leaks-have-a-
corrosive-effect-502125. 
35 Jack Moore, Trump Team Leaks About Israel’s Hack of Kaspersky Lab Could Further 
‘Damage’ Ties, Experts Warn, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:10 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/trump-team-leaks-about-israels-hack-kaspersky-lab-could-further-damage-
ties-686500; Callum Paton, Trump White House’s latest strategy to deal with leaks…has been leaked, 
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 14, 2017, 7:47 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-white-houses-newest-
strategy-deal-leaks-has-been-leaked-664756. 
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leaks will likely hamper the freer flow of information between these 
countries that developed after 9/11.36 
The American reaction to 9/11 involved a shift in foreign policy, which 
included significant reforms in its intelligence community.37 The years 
following the attack and the changes which followed have left an indelible 
mark on the global fight against terrorism. 38 
The United States and the international community soon recognized 
that the “old terrorism” of the Cold Era had dissipated, leaving a new sort 
of threat.39 In response, Congress developed extensive legislation tackling 
national security, including international and domestic surveillance.40 To 
assist in the fight against terrorism, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act 
(“Patriot Act”) which emboldened the Department of Justice’s 
investigation into 9/11.41 The Patriot Act contained “the most sweeping 
 
 
36 Overton, supra note 11.  
37 BRENT DURBIN, THE CIA AND POLITICS OF US INTELLIGENCE REFORM 209-10 (2017). One of 
the primary factors attributed to allowing such an attack to occur in the United States was the poor 
coordination and information-sharing between federal agencies. Id. at 8; NATIONAL SECURITY, 
SURVEILLANCE, AND TERROR: CANADA AND AUSTRALIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 52 (Randy 
K. Lippert, et al., eds. 2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY, SURVEILLANCE, AND TERROR].  
38 The fight against international terrorism resulted in greater amounts of information being 
shared among concerned nations and larger collaborative efforts in combatting global threats. 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, at 2. Similarly, 
the scope of intelligence operations has also expanded to include both “non-traditional allies” and “a 
wider variety” of activities. Id. The events of September 11, 2001 led to a “radical restructuring” of 
American national security agencies and their activities. DURBIN, supra note 37, at 207.  
39 NATIONAL SECURITY, SURVEILLANCE, AND TERROR, supra note 37, 51-52. During the Cold 
War era, “transnational terrorism was primarily motivated by a range of political ideologies associated 
with nationalism, separatism, Marxism and nihilism,” but this threat was largely state-sponsored. Id. In 
contrast, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 drew attention to a different type of terrorism that 
was “diffusely structured” and sponsored by non-state actors. Id. at 52.  Still, the increased 
international cooperation seen today is primarily a result of globalization, and not of any particular 
event. INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, at 11.  
40 DURBIN, supra note 37, at 211. However, the resulting congressional action “lacked direction.” 
William Crotty, On the Home Front: Institutional Mobilization to Fight the Threat of International 
Terrorism, in THE POLITICS OF TERROR: THE U.S. RESPONSE TO 9/11 191, 196 (William Crotty ed. 
2016). See also id. at 196-97 (listing a series of congressional actions made in response to 9/11). This 
legislation also has been criticized for its negative impact on civil liberties. Tara Mythri Raghavan, In 
Fear of Cyberterrorism: An Analysis of the Congressional Response, 2003 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 
297, 311 (2003); John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for 
“Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s 
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2002). Despite this criticism, at the time of 
this legislative reform, constituent interests favored national defense over individual liberties due to 
the perceived external threat to the country’s security and protection. DURBIN, supra note 37, at 266.  
41 Id. at 1088. At the time of its passage, then Attorney General John Ashcroft commented that,  
Within hours of [its] passage…we made use of its provisions to begin enhanced information 
sharing between the law-enforcement and intelligence communities. We have used the 
provisions allowing nationwide search warrants for e-mail and subpoenas for payment 
information. And we have used the Act to place those who access the Internet through cable 
companies on the same footing as everyone else. 
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expansion of government surveillance authorities” in decades.42 However, 
the extent of surveillance was not fully known until a few years later, with 
the 2013 controversy surrounding Edward Snowden.43 The information 
disclosed about the United States’ data collection and surveillance 
programs catalyzed a new focus on privacy concerns among scholars and 
the public.44 
 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  
42 DURBIN, supra note 37, at 214. The bill passed with overwhelming support, and although 
“privacy-minded lawmakers” were concerned with its expansive surveillance powers, not much was 
done to address these fears. Id. However, concerned legislators did manage to insert a sunset clause of 
four years for several provisions. Id. at 213. The Act included amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (more commonly known as the “Wiretap Act”). 
USA Patriot Act, EPIC.ORG, https://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/ (last visited Jan. 5, 
2018). For instance, Section 216 of the Patriot Act extended the Wiretap Act to “authorize the 
installation of [such] devices to record all computer routing, addressing, and signaling 
information…by certifying that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.” John Podesta, USA Patriot Act: The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, HUMAN RTS., 
Winter 2002, at 1. The Act also allowed the transmission of intercepted “foreign intelligence 
information” to “any Federal Law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, 
or national security official” when it facilitates the “performance of [the] official duties” of the 
individual receiving the information. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 3365) [hereinafter Patriot Act]. The Patriot Act 
also broadened the definition of terrorism to include “domestic” terrorism; see How the USA Patriot 
Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patriot-act-
redefines-domestic-terrorism (last visited Jan. 5, 2018) (critiquing the expansion of the definition of 
terrorism to include domestic groups); Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331).  
43  DURBIN, supra note 37, at 236. In 2013, former CIA employee and NSA contractor, Edward 
Snowden, revealed himself to be the source of a series of documents describing NSA programs and 
surveillance activities against U.S. and foreign citizens; Kim Zetter, NSA Contractor Outs Himself as 
Source of Surveillance Documents, WIRED (June 9, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/nsa-
leaker-outs-himself/. Discussing his decision to release the documents Snowden stated that the NSA’s 
surveillance practices are “an existential threat to democracy.” Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & 
Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, 
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-
whistleblower-surveillance. The Snowden documents also revealed foreign governments’ surveillance 
activities as well; see Nick Hopkins, UK Gathering Secret Intelligence Via Covert NSA Operation, 
GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-
intelligence-nsa-prism (“UK security agency GCHQ gaining information from world's biggest internet 
firms through US-run Prism programme.”); Philp Dorling, Exposed: Australia’s Asia Spy Network, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/exposed-australias-asia-spy-network-20131030-2whia.html (“A secret US National Security 
Agency document leaked by Mr Snowden … reveal[ed] the existence of a highly sensitive signals 
intelligence collection program conducted from sites at US embassies and consulates and from the 
diplomatic missions of other “Five eyes” intelligence partners including Australia, Britain and 
Canada.”) 
44 See Ashley Deeks, An International Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291, 326 
(2015). “The Snowden revelations initiated a large number of inter-state interactions and critical public 
statements about the legality and propriety of surveillance of foreign leaders and citizens.” Id.; see 
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The Snowden disclosures uncovered a trove of information regarding 
the current intelligence-sharing practices of the United States and its 
foreign partners, including the remaining Five Eyes nations. The leak 
revealed that Britain’s premier spy agency, the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), had “secretly gained access to 
the network of cables which carry the world’s phone calls and internet 
traffic” and could process large amounts of “sensitive personal 
information which it [shared] with its American partner, the National 
Security Agency.”45 Moreover, about 850,000 NSA employees and U.S. 
private contractors had access to GCHQ databases.46  
The information-sharing between Five Eyes nations continues to 
advance as security threats develop. In 2017, the U.S. began working on 
cooperative cyber operations with its Five Eyes allies.47 United States 
Cyber Command (“CYBERCOM”),48 the unified combatant command49 
charged with “the planning and execution of global cyberspace 
 
 
generally Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-
perceptions/. 
45 Ewen MacAskill, GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables For Secret Access to World’s 
Communications, GUARDIAN (Jun. 21, 2013, 12:23 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa. 
46 Id. 
47 Mark Pomerleau, Coming Soon: Joint International Cyberspace Operations, C4ISRNET (June 
16, 2017). https://www.c4isrnet.com/disa/disa-vision-guide/2017/06/16/coming-soon-joint-
international-cyberspace-operations/. A U.S. intelligence official shared that the cooperation could be 
“threat intelligence information where each nation is acting independently but synchronized….one 
nation supporting another with capability or capacity on another nation’s host networks…[or] 
integrated operations on a shared environment.” Id.  
48 CYBERCOM is a unified combatant command first created in 2009 to respond to cyber-
attacks. Jim Garamone & Lisa Ferdinando, DOD Initiates Process to Elevate U.S. Cyber Command to 
Unified Combatant Command, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1283326/dod-initiates-process-to-elevate-us-cyber-
command-to-unified-combatant-command/. CYBERCOM “unifies the direction of cyberspace 
operations” within the U.S. Department of Defense and contains service elements from the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), U.S. STRATEGIC 
COMMAND (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-
View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/.  
49 A unified combatant command is a “command with broad continuing missions under a single 
commander…that is established and so designated by the President.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES xix (2013). Combatant Commands are 
given command authority over assigned forces to complete their proscribed mission as established by 
the President. Id. at xix, IV-5. CYBERCOM was elevated to a full unified combatant command by 
President Trump in August 2017. Mark Pomerleau, DOD Still Working Toward CYBERCOM 
Elevation, FIFTH DOMAIN (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2017/10/16/dod-still-working-toward-cybercom-
elevation/. 
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operations,”50 first drafted its concept of operations draft51 with the Five 
Eyes allies.52 A top official at CYBERCOM explained that the inclusion 
of Five Eyes partners in this effort “truly acknowledge[d] the global nature 
of cyberspace and the benefit of collaboration to protect…infrastructure 
and defend against our mutual adversaries.”53 Collaborating with Five 
Eyes partners was a clear choice for CYBERCOM as “[w]hen it comes to 
the sharing of information with regards to defensive cyberspace 
operations, the mechanisms are already there.”54 As the U.S. expands its 
cyber operations, it will continue to rely on the “robust intelligence 
sharing” already in place, deepening the links within the Five Eyes 
alliance. 55 While the U.S. regularly collaborates with other nations in 
intelligence operations, Britain remains its closest partner in this 
endeavor.56 In fact, the partnership between the U.S. and U.K. is so close 
that “it becomes very difficult to know who is doing what.”57 
B. The United Kingdom 
 The Snowden disclosures have prompted global dialogues over 
American governmental surveillance and have raised concerns about 
intelligence-sharing with and among its partners, particularly the United 
Kingdom.58 According to documents leaked by Snowden in 2013,  phone, 
 
 
50 Mark Pomerleau, Cyber Command Greater New, Expanded Authorities, FIFTH DOMAIN (Feb. 
28, 2018), https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2018/02/28/cyber-command-granted-new-and-
expanded-authorities/.  
51 Concept of operations, also known as CONOPS, is “[a] verbal or graphic statement that clearly 
and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be down using 
available resources.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED 
TERMS 48 (2018).  
52 Mark Pomerleau, US Seeks Stronger International Cyber Defense Partnerships, FIFTH 
DOMAIN (June 14, 2017), https://www.c4isrnet.com/disa/disa-vision-guide/2017/06/14/us-seeks-
stronger-international-cyber-defense-partnerships/. 
53 Id.  
54 Pomerleau, supra note 47. 
55 Id. 
56 Yusra Aziz, The Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, PRIVACY END (July 17, 2017), 
https://www.privacyend.com/five-eyes-intelligence-alliance/. 
57 Id. 
58See Laura Poitras et al., NSA Spied on European Union Offices, DER SPIEGEL (Jun. 29, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nsa-spied-on-european-union-offices-a-908590.html; Lana 
Lam, Edward Snowden: US Government Has Been Hacking Hong Kong and China for Years, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (June 14, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1259508/edward-snowden-us-g 
overnment-has-been-hacking-hong-kong-and-china; Dan Roberts and Spencer Ackerman, US 
Lawmakers Call for Review Of Patriot Act After NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (Jun. 10, 
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/patriot-act-nsa-surveillance-review. 
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internet, and email records of British citizens have been analyzed and 
stored by the NSA.59 Moreover, this practice was approved by UK 
intelligence officials.60 Other Five Eyes countries also participated in these 
activities, which included the capture of “incidentally collected” 
communications by the NSA, resulting in untargeted individuals’ 
information being stored.61 This means that individuals not suspected of 
any wrongdoing had their information collected by a foreign state, which 
then freely shared that information with their local government, 
circumventing any domestic safeguards in place.62 The Snowden 
disclosures also revealed that in 2005, the NSA put forth a procedure 
about spying on British and other Five Eye nation citizens when the 
partner government has expressly forbidden the U.S. from doing so.63 
Additionally, in 2014 it was revealed that the GCHQ utilized a NSA 
database that the U.S. government has used to collect and store 
 
 
59 James Ball, US And UK Struck Secret Deal To Allow NSA To ‘Unmask’ Britons’ Personal 
Data, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/20/us-uk-secret-
deal-surveillance-personal-data. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. In addition, the NSA used British citizens’ data to direct “pattern of life” analysis which 
allows the examination of parties related to a target by a friend of a friend of a friend. For a typical 
Facebook user, this could extend to more than 5 million people.  Id. 
62 Public authorities in the United Kingdom like the “Government Communication Headquarters 
(GCHQ) can also serve secret legal processes with non-disclosure orders similar to those mentioned 
above under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).” Jon Penney, Warrant Canaries 
Beyond the First Amendment: A Comment, in INTERNET MONITOR 2014: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
DIGITAL WORLD 49, 49 (Harvard Univ. Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society ed. 2014). 
Additionally, law enforcement officials in the UK are able to force technology companies to hand over 
encryption keys. The law also makes it a criminal offense for the affected company to provide notice 
to users that an encryption key has been provided. Alessandro Liotta, New Powers to Compel 
Decryption and Disclosure of Encryption Keys, INT’L L. OFFICE (Nov. 20, 2007), 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/IT-Internet/United-Kingdom/Pillsbury-Winthrop-
Shaw-Pittman-LLP/New-Powers-to-Compel-Decryption-and-Disclosure-of-Encryption-Keys. Legally 
requiring these organizations to produce these keys is another form of compelled speech. Penney, 
supra note 62, at 50. This type of compelled speech has been of particular concern in the U.S. recently 
due to Apple’s dispute with the FBI over decrypting a suspect’s iPhone which raised key Fifth 
Amendment concerns. David Kravets, Forget the 1st Amendment, Apple to Plead the 5th in Iphone 
Crypto Flap, ARS TECHNICA (FEB. 24, 2016, 3:32 PM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/02/forget-the-1st-amendment-apple-to-plead-the-5th-in-iphone-crypto-flap/. In the United 
Kingdom, some technologies companies have chosen to provide an explanation every time they revoke 
a key voluntarily, but when forced by authorities to revoke encryption keys an explanation is not 
provided. This practice is known as “tipping off” others that a law enforcement request prompted the 
encryption key’s revocation. Penney, supra note 62, at 51.  No clear legal basis currently exists to 
protect this practice though. Id. For example, “[t]he UK Human Rights Act (1998) includes rights to 
freedom of expression under Article 10, but this right is explicitly ‘qualified’ and can be limited for a 
host of state objectives, including ‘national security,’ ‘territorial integrity,’ ‘public safety, [sic] and 
‘prevention of disorder . . .’” See id. 
63 Penney, supra note 62, at 51. The memo also specified that partner countries cannot be 
informed of the surveillance or the procedures used. Id. 
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approximately 200 million global text messages daily to search for 
information on individuals in the U.K.64 
A greater source of concern in the U.K. is the recent passage of 
legislation, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (“IPA”), granting the 
British government sweeping surveillance powers. This legislation enables 
the British government to keep a record of every website each citizen 
visits for up to a year.65 This law is also in conflict with the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which was approved by the European 
Union Parliament.66 In response to its passage, over 200,000 people signed 
a petition asking for the IPA’s repeal.67 Liberty, a civil liberties group, 
successfully crowdfunded over £50,000 to challenge the Act’s expansive 
grant of surveillance powers to the British government.68 In June 2017, the 
British High Court granted the organization permission to continue their 
challenge against the UK government.69 An added complication is the 
effect of the United Kingdom’s referendum to leave the European Union 
in June 2016.70 However, the United Kingdom is not set to leave the EU  
 
 
64 Edward Snowden: Leaks That Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964. 
65 James Vincent, The UK Now Wields Unprecedented Surveillance Powers- Here’s What It 
Means, VERGE (Nov. 29, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/11/23/13718768/uk-
surveillance-laws-explained-investigatory-powers-bill. This information would include what times an 
individual visited a site, the IP address used, and information about the computer used to access the 
domain. Id.  
66 Pascal Crowe, Could the European GDPR Undermine the UK Investigatory Powers Act?, 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE: MEDIA POLICY PROJECT BLOG (Dec. 19, 
2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/12/19/could-the-european-gdpr-undermine-the-
uk-investigatory-powers-act/. 
67 Claire Hopping, Liberty Launches Legal Challenge Investigatory Powers Act, ITPRO (Mar. 2, 
2017), http://www.itpro.co.uk/it-legislation/28251/liberty-launches-legal-challenge-against-
investigatory-powers-act. 
68 Rene Millman, Liberty Wins Right to Challenge Snoopers’ Charter, ITPRO (June 30, 2017), 
http://www.itpro.co.uk/it-legislation/28973/liberty-wins-right-to-challenge-snooper-s-charter; see also 
The People vs The Snoopers’ Charter, LIBERTY HUM. RTS, https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/campaigning/people-vs-snoopers-charter (last visited May 7, 2018).  
69 Millman, supra note 68. Liberty was granted permission to attack the IPA provision that forces 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to retain logs of everyone’s “emails, phone calls, texts and entire 
web browsing history” to turn over to state agencies. Id. Liberty also was granted permission to 
challenge several other provisions of the IPA, beginning March 2018 at the latest. Id. Liberty also 
looks to attack the IPA’s grant of three other bulk powers: bulk interception (the British government’s 
collection and surveillance of calls without “any suspicion of criminal activity”), bulk hacking (the 
government’s ability to “access, control, and alter electronic devices”), and bulk personal data sets (the 
government’s ability to control and connect private and public databases containing a swath of 
information “ripe for abuse and discrimination”). Natasha Lomas, Liberty is Crowdfunding a Legal 
Challenge to UK Surveillance Law, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/09/liberty-is-crowdfunding-a-legal-challenge-to-uk-surveillance-law/. 
70 Alex Hunt and Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU, 
BBC (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. 
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until Summer 2019,  prior to when the GDPR must be implemented by the 
UK as a EU Member State.71 The provisions of the GDPR provide strong 
incentives for compliance, since data controllers found in breach can face 
fines up to 4%72 of global annual gross revenue or €20 million.73  
In March 2015, Privacy International, a United Kingdom-based 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) focused on championing privacy 
rights, along with nine other NGOs, filed an application to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) challenging the British government’s 
surveillance practices.74 The application specifically contests the bulk 
interception of Internet traffic in the United Kingdom’s fiber-optic cables 
and the British government’s access to information shared by the United 
States from their intelligence-gathering procedures.75 The Application 
complains that the British government “asserts an almost unfettered right 
to obtain those [communications] which have been intercepted by the 
intelligence services of other states, including the National Security 
Agency (NSA) of the United States of America.” 76 The application is the 
result of several legal complaints brought before the United Kingdom 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and were joined together.77 The Tribunal 
 
 
71  Liat Clark, What Theresa May’s Brexit Plans Could Mean for You, Your Data, and Your 
Privacy, WIRED (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/the-uk-needs-europes-data-protection-
laws.  
72 Hasan, supra note 71; Jonathan Millard & Tyler Newby, EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation: Sweeping Changes Coming to European and U.S. Companies, ABA PRIVACY & DATA 
SECURITY (May 23, 2016), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/technology/articles/spring2016-0516-eu-general-
data-protection-regulation.html. 
73 That amount is equal to approximately 21,456,700.00 U.S. dollars. Previously, fines were 
capped at €1 million or 2% of the global gross revenue. European Commission Press Release IP / 15 / 
5176, Commission Proposal on New Data Protection Rules to Boost EU Digital Single Market 
Supported by Justice Ministers, THE COMMISSION (June 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5176_en.htm.  
74 The other nine NGOs participating are the American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty 
International, Bytes for All, the Canadian Civil Liberties Union, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Legal Resources 
Centre, and Liberty. Applicants’ Reply to Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom at 
35, App. No. 24960/15, 10 Human Rights Organisations v. The United Kingdom [2014] (Eng.) 
[hereinafter 10 Human Rights Organisations Applicant Reply]. 
75 10 Human Rights Organisations v. United Kingdom, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/992 [hereinafter 10 Human Rights Organisations]. 
76 10 Human Rights Organisations Applicant Reply, supra note 74.  
77 UK NGOs Challenge UK Government Surveillance at the European Court of Human Rights, 
OPEN RTS. GRP. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/2017/uk-ngos-
challenge-uk-government-surveillance-at-the-european-court-of-human-rights. In response to the 
Snowden revelations that repealed mass surveillance by UK intelligence agencies, Big Brother Watch, 
a UK-based civil liberties group, filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights. Id.; 
About, BIG BROTHER WATCH, https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/about/. Their application “challeng[ed] 
the legality of the indiscriminate surveillance of UK citizens and the bulk collection of vast amounts of 
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ruled that the British government’s interception of information and any 
access to information supplied by the United States “[was] lawful in 
principle.”78 The application brought by the NGOs challenges the Tribunal 
findings.79 In November 2017, the European Court of Human Rights heard 
arguments from both parties, and a decision is pending.80 
The application relies on the Snowden disclosures regarding the United 
States intelligence-gathering programs and the Five Eyes Agreement to 
claim that United Kingdom Intelligence Services “are likely to have broad 
access to the fruits of US communications surveillance, including pursuant 
to the bulk surveillance programmes.”81 The existence of Five Eyes is a 
key premise to this concern since it establishes a “long-standing 
arrangement”82 of intelligence-sharing between the United States and 
United Kingdom, culminating in British intelligence having access to 
hundreds of millions of text messages.83 
 
 
their personal information and communications by UK intelligence agencies (including GCHQ) under 
the . . . Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000” in violation of British citizens’ right to a 
private life. Big Brother Watch and Others v UK at the European Court of Human Rights, BIG 
BROTHER WATCH (Nov. 3, 2017), https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/2017/11/big-brother-watch-and-
others-v-uk-at-the-european-court-of-human-rights/. Additionally, the case questions “whether greater 
controls are needed on the receipt of intercepted foreign intelligence so that it doesn’t circumvent UK 
safeguards.” Id. 
78 10 Human Rights Organisations, supra note 75.  The United Kingdom Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal ruled that in regards to the intelligence-sharing practices between the United States and 
United Kingdom the “rules need [not] [] be contained in statute [] or even in a code… Appropriate 
rules or arrangements exist and are publicly known and confirmed to exist, with their content 
sufficiently signposted, such as to give an adequate indication of it” and that these practices are indeed 
“subject to proper oversight.” Liberty & Others vs. the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ [2014] UKIPTrib 
13_77-H, 23, http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/IPT_13_168-173_H.pdf. 
79 10 Human Rights Organisations, supra note 75. In February 2015, the Tribunal found that 
information gathered prior to the proceedings was unlawful since the legal framework surrounding its 
collection was secret. Id. In June 2015, the Tribunal ruled that the British government illegally 
surveilled on two of the claimants, Amnesty International and the Legal Resources Centre. Id.  
80 Recap: 10 Human Rights Organisations vs. the United Kingdom, PRIVACY INT’L (Nov. 7, 
2017), https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/624. 
81 10 Human Rights Organisations Applicant Reply, supra note 74, at 34. The Application 
mentions PRISM and Upstream along with the corresponding American legal authority, establishing 
what large amounts of information would be available through information-sharing agreements. Id. at 
32.  
82 Id. at 33-34.  “Intelligence sharing between the US and UK must be viewed within the context 
of a long-standing arrangement between the intelligence activities of the two countries, along with 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand[.]” Id. at 33. 
 
83 10 Human Rights Organisations, supra note 75. James Ball, NSA Collects Millions of Text 
Messages Daily in ‘Untargeted’ Global Sweep, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-
untargeted-global-sweep. The claimants’ complaint alleges the data interception and information-
sharing violate Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights; it also argues that the 
nation’s bulk interception program discriminates based on national origin which violates Article 14. 10 
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Britain’s eventual exit from the European Union will have a 
complicated effect on its current data protection regime and its future data 
transfers with its former Member states.84 The extent of the effect of 
Britain’s exit from the EU upon its data protection regime and 
accompanying business interests is a question that can only be answered 
by watching what the United Kingdom will do in the coming years.85 Until 
then, it is likely that the status quo regarding its intelligence-sharing 
practices with the U.S. and other Five Eyes countries will continue.86  
C. Germany  
After the Snowden leaks revealed that U.S. intelligence agencies had 
been monitoring Chancellor Angela Merkel and millions of other German 
citizens, the relationship between Germany and the United States became 
strained.87  Germany asked the U.S. to form a “no spy” agreement, like 
other agreements allegedly already in existence between the U.S. and 
allies providing for intelligence-sharing between them.88 The “no spy” 
 
 
Human Rights Organisations, supra note 75; 10 Human Rights Organisations Applicant Reply, supra 
note 74, at 101-06. The application also alleges Article 6 violations in the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal proceedings. 10 Human Rights Organisations v. UK, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/amicus/echr/liberty-gchq/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
84 Some Brexit supporters oppose the numerous regulations imposed and required by the 
European Union since it eradicates national sovereignty and stifles free markets. Presumably, the 
numerous data protections required by EU legislation and the European Court of Justice are viewed 
just as unfavorably.  How and why Brexit Triumphed, ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2017), 
http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21713821-first-books-try-explain-shock-referendum-
last-june-how-and-why-brexit. While the GDPR will apply to companies outside of the EU like the EU 
Data Protection Directive before it, if Britain chooses to be part of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), then the GDPR would apply directly to the United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
TRANSFERRING YOUR DATA OUTSIDE OF THE EU (Mar. 12, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/data-collection/data-transfer/index_en.htm.  
85 For example, in reference to Brexit, a Microsoft’s UK Government Affairs Manager said that 
the company would reconsider its commitment to the UK as a result of its departure from the EU; 
Microsoft later clarified that this particular position expressed by a Microsoft employee was not 
“reflective of the company’s views.”” Peter Bright, Microsoft Mulls Cutting UK Datacenter 
Investment Amid Brexit Concerns, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/01/brexit-tariff-fears-could-see-microsoft-cut-uk-datacenter-
investment/?comments=1&post=32690447&mode=quote. 
86  The other Five Eyes countries similarly impose nondisclosure orders and do not allow free 
speech or freedom of expression to overwhelm national security concerns. See generally Penney, 
supra note 62. 
87 Anthony Faiola, Germans, Still Outraged by NSA Spying, Learn Their Country May Have 
Helped, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nsa-scandal-
rekindles-in-germany-with-an-ironic-twist/2015/04/30/030ec9e0-ee7e-11e4-8050-
839e9234b303_story.html?utm_term=.51ea5ce08fd3. 
88 The referenced, pre-existing intelligence-sharing agreement, the UKUSA Agreement discussed 
in PART II, has been a matter of public record since 2010 after the declassification of a 1955 U.S. 
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agreement advocated by top German officials between the two countries 
never materialized.89 Although the talks between Germany and the United 
States did not result in any formal agreements, President Obama pledged 
that the U.S. had “taken the unprecedented step of ordering our 
intelligence communities to take the privacy interests of non-U.S. persons 
into account in everything that they do—something that has not been done 
before and most other countries in the world do not do . . . .” President 
Obama further commented that the Unites States is “committed to a U.S.-
 
 
National Security Agency (NSA) document entitled “U.K.-U.S. Communications Intelligence 
Agreement.” Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortensen, In Wake of Espionage Revelations, United 
States Declines to Reach Comprehensive Intelligence Agreement with Germany, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 
815, 816 (2014). The current agreement between these countries is known as the “Five Eyes” 
agreement. The term “Five Eyes” refers to the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The term originates from the introduction of a new 
classification level, “SECRET – AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY,” introduced by the 
intelligence-sharing agreement. James Cox, Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community, 
OPENCANADA.ORG, https://www.opencanada.org/features/canada-and-the-five-eyes-intelligence-
community/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).The document revealed “intelligence sharing between the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, includ[ing] provisions 
governing collection of signal traffic; acquisition of communications documents and 
equipment;…cryptanalysis; decryption and translation; and acquisition of information regarding 
communications organizations, procedures, practices, and equipment.” Daugirdas & Mortensen, supra, 
at 816. The NSA’s accompanying statement emphasized “[t]he bonds, forged in the heat of a world 
war and tempered by decades of trust and teamwork, remain essential to future intelligence successes.” 
Id. In addition to public concern of American surveillance in Germany stemming from press coverage 
of the Snowden leaks, several German federal employees were arrested and suspected of sharing 
German intelligence with U.S. intelligence agencies which led to the departure of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Berlin station chief. Joseph Fitsanakis, German Court Sentences Intelligence 
Officer Who Spied for CIA, INTELNEWS.ORG (Mar. 17, 2016), https://intelnews.org/2016/03/17/01-
1873/.  
89 According to a U.S. administrative official familiar with the negotiations, “‘What the Germans 
want, and wanted, is that we would never do anything against their laws on their territory.’ That is an 
agreement the United States ‘has with no country.’” David E. Sanger, U.S. and Germany Fail to Reach 
Deal on Spying, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A3. The failure of both sides to reach a deal in the 
ensuing aftermath reportedly left German and U.S. officials angry, with each side blaming the other 
for the conflict. Id. President Obama commented on the matter, “It’s not actually correct to say that we 
have a ‘no-spy agreement’ with Great Britain. That's not actually what happens. There's no country 
where we have a no-spy agreement. We have, like every other country, an intelligence capability, and 
then we have a range of partnerships with all kinds of countries.” Daugirdas & Mortensen, supra note 
88, at 818. During negotiations between President Obama’s national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, 
and Chancellor Merkel’s advisor of foreign policy, Christoph Heugsen, Ms. Rice allegedly revealed 
that the “United States did not have no-spy agreements with any of its close allies, even with the other 
members of the so-called Five Eyes . . . which share virtually all of their intelligence.” Sanger, supra at 
A3. Ms. Rice also reportedly shared that “[a]ny such agreement with Germany would set a precedent 
that every other major European ally, along with the Japanese, the South Koreans and others, would 
soon demand to replicate.” Id. See also Federal Chancellery, AMERICAN INST. FOR CONTEMPORARY 
GERMAN STUDIES, http://www.aicgs.org/issue/federal-chancellery/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). These 
statements suggest that while the United States is comfortable with deeper cooperation with its 
longstanding Western allies, the American government is hesitant to share the extent of its surveillance 
programs with some of its newer partners. Id. 
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German cyber dialogue to close further the gaps that may exist . . . to 
make sure that there is transparency and clarity about . . . our goals and our 
intentions[.]”90 Although it appears no formal agreement, at least publicly, 
has been arranged between the United States and Germany, the NSA and 
the German BND have resumed joint surveillance since early 2016.91  
Recent scandals have plagued the BND, such as recent revelations that 
the NSA’s collection and surveillance of Germans’ data was not 
completely unknown by German intelligence. Even more troubling are the 
reports that German intelligence knew the NSA was spying on German 
citizens in violation of domestic law.92 The culmination of growing 
concerns over data protection, the BND, and Germany’s relationship with 
the U.S. in the intelligence context exists in a newly proposed legislation 
amending Germany’s legal framework surrounding government 
surveillance. Notably, the amendments proposed would permit Germany 
to monitor foreigners’ communications, a practice that is currently illegal 
under the current G10 Act.93 Like the U.S. legal guidelines regarding 
NSLs and FISA orders, the proposed BND bill lacks judicial oversight. 
Both the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the ECHR have 
determined that surveillance legislation missing independent supervision 
cannot stand by holding that “prior control by an independent body, such 
as . . . a judicial arrangement, is required when intrusive surveillance 
measures are likely to reveal highly personal information” and that “the 
omission of a requirement that an authorizing judge independently assess 
the reasonableness of suspicion [helped] violate an applicant’s privacy 
 
 
90 Daugirdas & Mortensen, supra note 88 at, 818-19.  
91 Tina Bellon, German Spies Revive Internet Snooping Work With U.S.: Reports, REUTERS (Jan 
3, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-spying-usa-idUSKBN0UM29Z20160108. 
92 See generally Malk Baumgärtner, Nikolaus Blome et al., German Intelligence Under Fire for 
NSA Cooperation, DER SPEIGEL (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agency-bnd-under-fire-for-nsa-
cooperation-a-1030593.html. As a result, De-Cix, “the world’s largest Internet exchange point,” is 
suing BND for legal orders issued to them requiring the mass surveillance of “communications 
flowing through its Frankfurt Internet exchange point” under German’s G10 Act. David Meyer, 
World’s Biggest Internet Hub Sues German Government Over Surveillance, FORTUNE (Sept. 16, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/16/de-cix-surveillance-germany/. The G10 Act “is analogous to the 
controversial U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and allows the strategic monitoring of 
international communications that flow through Germany.” Id. 
93Christine Gavalga, German Foreign Intelligence Bill Fails Human Rights Standards, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & PRIVACY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/german-foreign-intelligence-bill-fails-
human-rights-standards/.  The bill creates three different types of protection for communications that is 
contingent on individual’s nationality. Id. German nationals cannot have their information 
intentionally obtained by the BNS within German’s borders nor can the BND compel a German 
communication service to do so. Id. EU citizens that are not German may have their information 
collected at any time if it is deemed necessary. The remaining class, non-EU foreigners, can have their 
information collected as necessary to combat domestic or foreign security risks at “an early stage.” Id.  
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rights” respectively.94  
Despite the tension supplied by the Snowden disclosures, German and 
American intelligence agencies are working together again due to renewed 
national security concerns after the Paris terrorist attacks.95 Despite 
allegations that the United States had continued to attempt its use of the 
BND’s technology to analyze European data, the German government has 
continued to work towards deeper cooperation with other countries to 
create a joint intelligence database.96 
While the U.S. and its allies have worked together to form an 
international coalition to combat threats to their own national security, the 
international community has been sluggish in addressing threats to 
individual privacy rights.97 There are substantial and compelling reasons 
for states’ unwillingness to develop an international framework that 
regulates government surveillance, espionage, and data sharing. One of the 
most significant domestic and international concerns is the prevention of 
terrorism and national security.98 The very nature of espionage itself 
requires secrecy to be effective as ongoing investigations and data 
collection are dependent on the other party remaining unaware of 
surveilling parties. 
III. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE THROUGH LITIGATION & THE PRIVACY 
SHIELD 
While the ECHR has yet to rule in 10 Human Rights Organisations v 
 
 
94 Id. 
95 See Germany Restarts Joint Intelligence Surveillance With US, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 1, 
2016), http://www.dw.com/en/germany-restarts-joint-intelligence-surveillance-with-us/a-18968519. 
96 Sumi Somaskanda, Is Big Brother coming to Germany?, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 14, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/12/big-brother-coming-germany-
161213062129779.html. 
97 Deeks, supra note 44, at 313-15. For example, the right to privacy has already been recognized 
by international bodies such as the United Nations and Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits unlawful interference with that right. Rikke Frank 
Joergensen, Can Human Rights Law Bend Mass Surveillance?, DANISH INST. FOR HUM. RTS. (Feb. 27, 
2014), https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/can-human-rights-law-bend-mass-surveillance. 
Unlawful interference undisputedly applies to the collection of electronic communication or data 
of an individual. Id. Furthermore, the ICCPR requires states to affirmatively ensure they have a legal 
framework that actually protects privacy rights from such interference, regardless of its source. Id. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the applicable standards that demonstrate when government 
surveillance is unlawful. Deeks, supra note 44, at 305.  States also disagree on the scope of this “right 
to privacy” and whether it applies extraterritorially. Id. So, while the ICCPR would allow a nation to 
raise an interstate complaint against an offending country, this complaint procedure is very unlikely to 
ever be used. Joergensen, supra. 
98 Deeks, supra note 44,  at 313-15. 
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United Kingdom, there have been significant developments regarding 
government surveillance and data transfers between the United States and 
United Kingdom under the Privacy Shield,99 which is a result of the 
European Data Protection Directive .100 
The EU Data Protection Directive prohibits data transfer from Member 
States to nations which do not have “adequate” levels of protection.101 
Since the United States was not one of the states deemed to have the 
requisite adequacy required under the Directive, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and the European Commission underwent negotiations that 
resulted in the Safe Harbor Agreement.102  The U.S. Department of 
Commerce proposed a “safe harbor” system designed to shelter data 
transfers from Article 25 of the EU Data Protection Directive, which 
proscribes data transfers to states without adequate levels of data 
protection.103  The Safe Harbor Agreement integrated aspects of the EU 
Data Protection Directive and distilled them to seven key principles which 
U.S. companies had to comply with in order to fall under the agreement.104 
Critically, however, the European Commission determined Safe Harbor 
principles could be limited as necessary for national security, public 
interest, or law enforcement requests.105 However, the Snowden 
disclosures regarding information-sharing between U.S. national 
intelligence agencies and private corporations led to the removal of Safe 
 
 
99 Privacy Shield Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). The EU Data Protection 
Directive called for national data protection agencies to be formed in each member state. 
Organizations need to register their databases with these national agencies and in certain cases gain 
prior approval before they can begin data processing. MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONGR. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL44257, U.S.-E.U. DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 3 
(2016).  
100 Interestingly, the EU Data Protection Directive was enacted because of growing concerns 
over data transfer bans between member states with stricter data protection standards and those 
member states with lesser levels of protection. Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the 
Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEXAS 
INT’L L. J. 421, 431 (2002).  While other legislation and regulations have further developed the legal 
framework of data protection in the European Union, the Data Protection Directive remains the most 
critical and comprehensive component in understanding data protection in Europe. Weiss & Archick, 
supra note 99.  
101 Loring, supra note 100, at 435-36. 
102 Id. at 451-52. 
103 Id.  
104 Weiss & Archick, supra note 99, at 5. Those seven data protection principles concerned 
notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and enforcement. See id. at 5-6.  
Additionally, companies were not forced to comply with Safe Harbor nor its replacement, the Privacy 
Shield, as several statutory exemptions exist which allow U.S. companies alternatives in conducting 
data transfers outside of Europe. See id. at 7, 14.  
105 Id. at 5. 
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Harbor.106 
This decision was later criticized and struck down by the European 
Court of Justice in Maximillian Schrems v. Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner.107 Maximillian Schrems filed a complaint with the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner looking to enjoin Facebook’s Irish 
subsidiary from transferring his personal data to their servers in the United 
States, troubled by government surveillance programs revealed by Edward 
Snowden.108  Schrems objected to the 2000 European Commission ruling 
that the Safe Harbor provided an adequate level of protection.109 Since the 
Irish data protection agency (DPA) dismissed the complaint as bound by 
the Data Protection Directive and the Commission’s previous ruling on the 
Safe Harbor agreement, Schrems brought an action to the Irish High Court 
which asked the European Court of Justice to review the issue.110 The 
European Court of Justice reviewed whether national “supervisory 
authorities could independently investigate challenges to the adequacy of 
protections provided by third states” through the Safe Harbor 
agreement.111  
The court’s ruling had a significant impact. The court determined that 
national data protection agencies did have the authority to investigate 
claims and organizations’ compliance with the EU Data Protection 
Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights despite the Safe Harbor 
agreement by the European Commission.112  Upon directly examining the 
Safe Harbor agreement, the European Court of Justice found it did not 
ensure the requisite level of data protection as required by the EU Data 
Protection Directive.113 Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive 
 
 
106 W. Gregory Voss, The Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Privacy Shield or Bust?, 19 J. 
INTERNET L. 1, 10 (2016).  
107 Kristina Daugridas & Julian Davis Mortensen, European Union and United States Conclude 
Agreement to Regulate Transatlantic Personal Data Transfers, 110 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 360, 362-63 
(2016) [hereinafter Personal Data Transfers]. 
108 Id. at 362. The Irish subsidiary also operates as the European headquarters for Facebook. Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
The Irish DPA dismissed the complaint, finding that it had no basis to evaluate the complaint 
since Facebook adhered to the Safe Harbor Agreement and the Irish DPA was thus bound by 
the 2000 decision by the European Commission recognizing that Safe Harbor provided an 
‘adequate level of protection’ as required by the [European Data Protection Directive]. 
Weiss & Archick, supra note 99, at 6.  
111 Personal Data Transfers, supra note 107, at 362. See also Weiss & Archick, supra note 99, at 
6-7.  
112 Weiss & Archick, supra note 99,  at 7. The national data protection agencies “‘must be able to 
examine, with complete independence, any claim concerning the protection of a person’s rights and 
freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to him.’” Id. 
113 Id. 
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requires the European Commission to examine the domestic laws of a non-
member state when ascertaining the adequacy of its data protection.114  As 
a result, the European Commission’s decision regarding Safe Harbor in 
2000 was invalid, and Schrems eliminated the legal viability of Safe 
Harbor as a mechanism to allow data transfers to continue between the 
United States and Europe.115 In reaching this decision, the European Court 
of Justice found that American “national security, public interest, and law 
enforcement” trumped the Safe Harbor principles when in conflict.116 Safe 
Harbor allowed and even “enable[d]” American law enforcement’s 
interference with European citizens’ fundamental data rights.117 
Prior to the Schrems ruling, the United States and the European Union 
were looking to change the legal framework of Safe Harbor.118 A few 
months after the court’s ruling, the United States and the EU announced a 
new agreement, the Privacy Shield, to replace Safe Harbor.119 It is unclear 
if the Privacy Shield can survive future scrutiny or legal battles.120 One of 
the more imminent challenges the Privacy Shield faces is the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR); the Privacy Shield will need to be revised 
in order to conform with the new legal framework.121  Max Schrems 
 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Personal Data Transfers, supra note 107, at 362. 
119 Id. at 365. The Privacy Shield is the current legal framework governing data transfers and 
processing between the United States and Member states of the European Union. Although it is similar 
to its predecessor, the Privacy Shield is stricter in certain areas. Doron S. Goldstein et al., 
Understanding the EU-US “Privacy Shield” Data Transfer Framework, 20 J. OF INTERNET L. 1, 18 
(2016).  
120 Id. at 21. European Parliament member, Jan Philipp Albrecht, called the Privacy Shield 
“‘little more than a reheated serving of the pre-existing Safe Harbor decision’ and a ‘sellout of the 
fundamental EU right to data protection.’” Natasha Lomas, Europe And US Seal ‘Privacy Shield’ Data 
Transfer Deal To Replace Safe Harbor, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/02/europe-and-us-seal-privacy-shield-data-transfer-deal-to-replace-
safe-harbor/ [hereinafter Lomas, Privacy Shield]. In discussing the Privacy Shield’s ability to 
withstand further scrutiny, Schrems said, “[I]t’s not really a problem to challenge it” because “[t]here 
are so many options to kill it.” Aaron Souppouris, The EU-US Privacy Shield is Up, But Its Future Is 
In Doubt, ENGADGET (Jul. 12, 2016),  https://www.engadget.com/2016/07/12/eu-us-privacy-shield-
data-protection/. See also generally Tomaso Falchetta, New “Shield,” Old Problems, MEDIUM (July 8, 
2016), https://medium.com/privacy-international/new-shield-old-problems-c23c646f681c#.mfc796i0z.  
Despite this uncertainty, more than fourteen hundred companies have signed up for the Privacy Shield 
including Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Amazon. See Privacy Shield List, PRIVACY SHIELD 
FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/list (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). See also Natasha Lomas, 
EU-US Privacy Shield Data Transfer Deal Faces Legal Challenge, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/27/eu-us-privacy-shield-data-transfer-deal-faces-legal-challenge/ 
[hereinafter Lomas, Legal Challenge]. 
121 Goldstein et al., supra note 119, at 21. The European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation will become effective on May 25, 2018. See id. 
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himself has commented on the deal saying “‘[i]t’s better than Safe Harbor, 
obviously, but far from what the ECJ has asked for.’”122  As predicted, the 
Privacy Shield has already been challenged in court.123  Despite the 
European Commission’s view that the Privacy Shield is robust enough to 
comply with the European Data Protection Directive in Safe Harbor’s 
place, it is unclear how the European Court of Justice will respond to the 
challenges raised.124  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: BUILDING TRUST & ESTABLISHING BASELINES 
The cases discussed within this note establish that European courts are 
comfortable with examining and evaluating intelligence-gathering 
practices, intelligence agencies’ activities and rationale, and their states’ 
legal framework. The level of scrutiny and robust analysis undertaken by 
 
 
122 Souppouris, supra note 120. 
123 Julia Fioretti & Dustin Voltz, Privacy Group Launches Legal Challenge Against EU-U.S. 
Data Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2016, 1:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-dataprotection-
usa-idUSKCN12Q2JK. Digital Rights Ireland filed the legal challenge against the Privacy Shield 
although very few details are known about the case. Lomas, Legal Challenge, supra note 120. Digital 
Rights Ireland also was a party in Maximillian Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner where 
their challenge successfully invalidated Safe Harbor. DRI Welcomes Landmark Data Privacy 
Judgment, DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.digitalrights.ie/dri-welcomes-
landmark-data-privacy-judgement/.  A French data rights group called La Quadrature du Net also 
filed suit, arguing the Privacy Shield should be annulled. Peter Sayer, A Second Privacy Shield Legal 
Challenge Increases Threat To EU-US Data Flows, PC WORLD (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:05 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/3138196/cloud-computing/a-second-privacy-shield-legal-challenge-
increases-threat-to-eu-us-data-flows.html. 
124 In response to the challenge raised by Digital Rights Ireland, a European Commission 
spokesperson commented, “As we have said from the beginning, the Commission is convinced that the 
Privacy Shield will live up to the requirements set out by the European Court of Justice which has 
been the basis for the negotiations.” Fioretti & Voltz, supra note 123. Max Schrems has challenged the 
Privacy Shield; he now is taking aim against the model clause provisions under the agreement. Glyn 
Moody, In“An Unusual Move,” US Government Asks to Join Key EU Facebook Privacy Case, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 13, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/eu-facebook-schrems-case-us-
government-amicus-curiae/. The U.S. has joined the suit as amicus curie for the first time in an Irish 
court; the trade implications are huge. Landmark EU-US Data Privacy Court Case Opens In Dublin, 
RTÉ.IE (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0207/850760-schrems-facebook-data/ 
[hereinafter RTÉ.IE].  Perhaps the European Court of Justice’s previous ruling in Schrems I (which 
struck down Safe Harbor) pushed the U.S. to intervene in this latest challenge. Again, Maximillian 
Schrems challenges the adequacy of U.S. laws in protecting Facebook users from government 
surveillance. Moody, supra. This latest challenge, Schrems II, provides a tremendous opportunity for 
the U.S. government. The United States is expected to argue that since Schrems I, new enhanced 
protections safeguard EU citizens’ privacy rights, and serious economic harm could occur if the 
European or Irish courts found otherwise. RTÉ.ie, supra. Regardless of the outcome, this case will 
place the U.S. government on the record without the protection of U.S. confidentiality laws. Moody, 
supra. Mr. Schrems believes this opportunity will provide greater insight into current U.S. surveillance 
practices because, “[n]ow they [the U.S.] have every chance to make their point, but we also have 
every chance to ask questions they have previously not had to respond to.” Moody, supra (emphasis 
added). 
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European courts has not only been critical to our current understanding of 
data protection but also has revealed the inadequacies and thin protection 
available for citizens within Five Eyes nations, particularly for those 
within the United States.125 This note advances three potential solutions 
that promote greater accountability and oversight within and among Five 
Eyes nations. First, this note encourages greater scrutiny by U.S. courts in 
evaluating the executive branch’s practices and rationale when national 
security is provided as the basis for its surveillance operations. Second, 
this note proposes increased transparency and responsibility between U.S. 
lawmakers and its national intelligence community. 
A. Less Deference to National Security as a Government Interest  
When it comes to national security, cases before American courts often 
experience “national security exceptionalism.”126 In 1936, Justice George 
Sutherland quoted John Marshall’s statement that “[t]he President is the 
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative 
with foreign nations.”127 This language has contributed to the development 
of the President’s “independent and unchecked…foreign affairs power.”128 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that courts regularly defer to the 
Executive Branch in matters regarding foreign relations.129  Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution assigns the President the title of “Commander in 
 
 
125  See James B. Rule, Opinion, When it Comes to Protecting its Citizens’ Data, Europe is  Way 
Ahead Of The U.S., L.A. Times (May 12, 2014, 6:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-
oe-rule-nsa-privacy-european-union-20140513-story.html. 
126 This note borrows the term from Professors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Weurth to neatly 
refer to the rationale that “all national security cases as a group should be subject to different analysis 
than cases not related to national security…[because] courts should defer to the executive branch 
because the courts lack expertise in the field of national security, or because national security issues 
are uniquely important.” Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Weurth, National Security Exceptionalism and 
the Travel Ban Litigation, LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2017, 3:00PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-
security-exceptionalism-and-travel-ban-litigation. 
127 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 394, 318 (1936).  
128 Edward A. Purcell Jr., Understanding Curtiss-Wright, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 653, 653 (2013). 
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20 (stating that the “authority vested in the President by an 
exertion of legislative power…plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power… as the sole organ 
of the federal government in the field of international relations” entitles the President to deference). 
See also generally Louis Fisher, The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright to 
Zivotofsky, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 149 (2016) (arguing that the Curtiss-Wright court’s “sole organ” 
language has been misunderstood and misapplied to impermissibly enlarged the president’s power 
over external affairs). 
129 Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659 (2000); 
see also Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (“[U]nless Congress specifically has 
provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the 
Executive in military and national security affairs.”). 
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Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the 
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”130 
This constitutional role along with Justice Sutherland’s opinion have 
served as presidential justifications for unilateral authority in U.S. foreign 
affairs.131 International conflicts in the twenty-first century pushed 
American presidents to use the Executive Branch as an “international 
policeman”132 to protect U.S. interests. 133 The same concerns for 
increased efficiency, greater difficulty in identifying national security 
threats, and the need for proactive protection against these targets 
motivated the expansion of executive power 134 today.135  When executive 
actions are legally challenged and national security is a proffered state 
rationale, “national security exceptionalism” sometimes influences courts 
to defer to the state’s judgment.136 This deference insulates executive 
action in the realm of international intelligence, necessary to defend 
national security against global threats,137 from meaningful judicial 
scrutiny.138 Moreover, agencies acting in the interest of national security 
receive deference due to their institutional expertise.139  
Critics are right to push back against broad deference shielding 
 
 
130 U.S. CONST., art. II § 2, cl. 1. 
131 David Gartner, Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. 
REV. 499, 530-33 (2012). 
132 Id. at 531. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 532-33 (quoting President Truman’s response to the Supreme Court opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer). 
135 See President Trump on Syria Strikes: Full Transcript and Video, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-syria-airstrikes-full-
transcript.html (stating that the April 2018 precision strikes on Syria are to end chemical warfare 
following the post -World War I effort to deter such security threats). But see Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 20, 2013, 4:02 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/373581528405905408 (“The President must get 
Congressional approval before attacking Syria-big mistake if he does not!”). 
136 “[T]he Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain terms that “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ 
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation... [and] we have 
previously invoked ‘our traditional deference to the judgment of the executive department in matters 
of foreign policy.’” United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 47 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Haig v. 
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
137 See supra note 39. 
138 Michael P. Fix & Kirk A. Randazzo, Judicial Deference and National Security: Applications 
of the Political Question and Act of State Doctrines, 6 DEMOCRACY & SEC. 1, 13 (2010). 
139 Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance 
Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 61, 115 (2014). See also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 
U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (quoting Rostker v. Goldbery, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)) (“[W]hen it comes to 
collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [national security and foreign relations], ‘the 
lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked.’”). 
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government action from robust judicial review when national security is 
raised as a governmental interest.140 Greater analysis by courts of the 
intelligence agencies’ activities provides “incentives for greater 
democratic responsiveness” from executive agencies.141 Such institutional 
analyses would also inform “courts’ deference with greater predictability” 
and also incentivize democratic accountability by improving 
accountability with judicial oversight142 as seen in the European 
challenges to governmental surveillance.143Additionally, increased 
discussions by courts as to what specific factors lead to justified deference 
would provide greater legal clarity while maintaining the integrity of 
national security concerns.144 However, there are substantial judicial 
barriers preventing such institutional analyses, limiting the creation of 
judicial oversight.145 The judicial doctrine surrounding the President’s 
Article II powers and executive privilege require additional, coinciding 
reforms to empower courts to engage in such an analysis.146 
B. Placing Responsibility on Congress 
Another takeaway from the European courts’ handling of government 
surveillance cases is the key role that the data protection framework of the 
European Union plays in creating both legal and procedural safeguards for 
individuals’ data. Both European judges and lawmakers contribute to the 
 
 
140 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Opinion, The Case Against Special Judicial Deference in Immigration 
And National Security Cases, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/22/the-case-against-special-
judicial-deference-in-immigration-and-national-security-cases/?utm_term=.11b53f0e3602; see also 
Jack M. Blakin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23 (2008).  
If the executive seeks greater efficiency, this requires a corresponding duty of greater 
disclosure before the fact and reporting after the fact to determine whether its surveillance 
programs are targeting the right people or are being abused. Judges must also counter the 
executive's increasing use of secrecy and the state secrets privilege to avoid accountability for 
its actions. Executive officials have institutional incentives to label their operations as secret 
and beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny. Unless legislatures and courts can devise effective 
procedures for inspecting and evaluating secret programs, the Presidency will become a law 
unto itself. 
Id. 
141 Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 465, 522 (2013) 
142 Id. at 523. 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 74-80, 107-117.  
144 Berger, supra note 141, at 525. See id. at 520-33, for an in-depth discussion of the advantages 
and limitations of judicial analyses of governmental agencies’ behavior and processes when making 
more specific deference determinations. 
145 Dalal, supra note 139, at 133. 
146 Id. at 132-33. 
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data protection regime, as should their American counterparts. American 
lawmakers have similarly accepted the executive’s judgment in foreign 
relations and intelligence.147 Similarly, Congress has avoided 
opportunities to curb the executive’s expanding privilege to withhold 
national security information from courts and Congress.148 Congress’s 
failure to ensure that the civilian supremacy of the military is balanced 
between itself and the executive contravenes the Constitution, republican 
government, and liberalism.149  
In order to effectively limit a magnified executive power150 and 
legislate in matters concerning government surveillance and foreign 
relations, Congress must then also have “access to national security 
information.”151 Such access will also support courts’ ability to protect 
litigants’ rights and “judicial subservience to executive interests.”152 In 
addition to requiring access to national security information, Congress 
must examine the current legal framework surrounding intelligence-
gathering and government surveillance. For instance, “[i]n its advice-and-
consent role, the Senate has taken ambassadorial and national security 
nominees as political hostages” undermining U.S. representation oversees 
and leadership in executive agencies.153 Additionally, lawmakers are 
uninformed about “the foreign policy, defense, and intelligence issues on 
which they vote.”154 Likewise, Congress suffers from a number of 
institutional and political obstacles155 ̶   national security committees 
remain structured as they did during the Cold War,156 fail to appreciate the 
relative complexity of cross-jurisdictional issues in a globalized political 
climate,157 neglect to oversee the intelligence community,158 and lack 
 
 
147 See Sarah Fowler, Note, Circumventing the Constitution for National Security: An Analysis 
of the Evolution of the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant 
Requirement, 4 U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 207, 223 (2014) (discussing 
Congress’s failure to regulate intelligence surveillance). 
148 See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to National Security Information, 45 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 219, 220-21 (2008). 
149 Id. at 221-22. 
150 Purcell, supra 128. 
151 Fisher, supra note 148, at 234. 
152 Id.  
153 KAY KING, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 6 (2010). 
154 Id. at 7.  
155 Id. at vii. 
156 Id. at 15.  
157 Id. at 16. 
158 Id. 
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commitment to diplomacy.159 The Constitution tasks Congress to oversee 
the Executive’s intelligence work, and Congress must take this 
responsibility seriously. Indeed, “[t]he solution to a lack of congressional 
oversight is conceptually easy but practically difficult.”160 Congress must 
both legislate and regularly exercise its authority to oversee the 
intelligence community, two assignments that require “significant political 
power and effort.”161 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both Schrems I and II, along with 10 Human Rights Organizations v 
United Kingdom, illustrate how legal challenges that attack the transfer of 
data between Five Eyes countries protect privacy effectively. These legal 
battles democratize the decisions that have been made about government 
surveillance with the help of judicial oversight working hand-in-hand with 
a legal framework that addresses government surveillance.   
The globalization of national security efforts makes it extremely 
difficult to ensure individual rights are not being violated, undermining the 
legitimacy of international intelligence.162 A legislative solution working 
with judicial review of national surveillance can provide the necessary 
oversight to ensure transparency and accountability. However, if 
Americans care about data privacy, Congress needs to maintain a broader, 
global perspective of the surveillance landscape. International information-
sharing has been largely unchecked,163 and while the privacy debate 
surrounding national surveillance regimes has become more robust post-
Snowden,164 “the privacy risks posed by global information sharing” have 
been absent from the conversation.165 While Snowden may not have been 
enough,166 perhaps the current interest in data protection, surveillance, and 
its use by foreign governments can promote oversight, accountability, and 
transparency over national security surveillance through judicial and 
congressional responsibility.167 Surveillance needs democratic governance 
 
 
159 Id. at 20. 
160 Dalal, supra note 139, at 135. 
161 Id. at 134. 
162 McGruddy, supra note 10, at 215-16. 
163 Kim, supra note 7. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Dalal, supra note 139, at 135. 
167 See Copy That: America Should Borrow From Europe’s Data-Privacy Law, ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21739961-gdprs-premise-consumers-should-
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desperately, but before we can ensure that the intelligence community 
respects the constitutional and legislative limits surrounding their 
operations, the U.S. needs to recognize that global intelligence-sharing 
must also have oversight, accountability, and transparency.  
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